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Paper Tigers, Fences-&-Fines or Co-Management?  
Community conservation agreements in  




Protected areas may be established and maintained at the expense of local 
communities (‘fences & fines’), although attempts to block local land use can be 
fruitless (‘paper tigers’). Innovation in protected area policy has led to the 
involvement of communities in protected-area management (‘co-management’). This 
paper aims to predict and study the emergence of such negotiated agreements to share 
the management of as well as the benefits from forest.  First, we develop a conceptual 
framework for understanding roles of co-management interventions. Second, we bring 
to our derived hypotheses unique panel data collected from a co-management policy 
implemented in Lore Lindu National Park, Indonesia. The results broadly support our 
model predictions, although there is mixed evidence in some cases, possibly due to 
the fact that our relatively rough data proxies often correlate with several model 
parameters.  
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1. Introduction 
Protected areas will continue to be an important instrument for conservation of 
biodiversity and other environmental services. In developing countries, they may be 
established and maintained at the expense of local communities (Kiss 1990; Swanson 
and Barbier 1992; Tisdell 1995). Such top-down management may be called ‘fences 
& fines’, highlighting exclusion. Yet sometimes the reality of protected areas is that 
attempts to block local land use are fruitless; then such parks are mere ‘paper tigers’. 
Conflicts over natural resources and property rights are among the reasons why such 
protected areas often fail to conserve (see Albers and Ferraro 2007; Bulte and Engel 
2007).
1  
We emphasize that these two possibilities do not exhaust the set of outcomes. 
There has been much innovation in protected area policy to involve local communities 
in protected-area management.
2 Typically, locals with long-standing claims to forest 
resources have been integrated into management plans alongside the development of 
new income streams such as from eco-tourism.
3 Such collaborative management, or 
‘co-management’, involves protected-area authorities negotiating with local people to 
share both the management of and the benefits from forest resources (Borrini-
Fayerabend et al. 2000; Carlsson and Berkes, 2005). For example, locals might take 
responsibility for forest protection and management in exchange for receiving rights 
to forest products and other benefits.
4 By defining property rights to natural resource 
use for local people, co-management schemes attempt to create club goods and enable 
                                                 
1 In developing countries, over 70% of natural forests are formally owned by the state (White and 
Martin 2002). Issues of customary use rights and enforcement of exclusion are relevant for immense 
areas.  
 
2 Trends towards community ownership of forest, for example, are said to follow from a number of 
rationales: evidence of successful cases of commons managemen (Ostrom 1990); clear failures of state 
management, perahps due to high costs of monitoring and enforcement; shrinking government budgets;  
social equity concerns;  and perhaps linked to some or all of these, promotion by international donors. 
Scherr et al. (2004) estimate that around 25% of forests are now owned or controlled in some way by 
resource-dependent communities. 
 
3 See, for example, Sims (2009) on rising consumption and decreasing poverty near parks in Thailand. 
 
4 Such projects are sometimes known as ‘integrated conservation and development projects’ (ICDPs). 
These involve varying levels of local participation from sharing the benefits from wildlife-related 
activities to community-based management where local people are trained to manage (see Brandon and 
Wells 1992). In parallel, governments in developing countries have sometimes implemented devolution 
reforms and policies that allow for the greater involvement of local communities or user groups in 
managing natural resources (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1999). Thus, there is also an element of enabling local 
participation in natural resource management by creating a new class of ‘stakeholders’. 
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people to benefit from the direct use values of resources, e.g. harvesting non-timber 
forest products (NTFP) (see Baland and Platteau 1996; Knox and Meinzen-Dick 
2000; Bulte and Engel 2007).
5 The objective of such projects is two-fold: to ensure 
the protection of natural resources in situ; and, at the same time, to provide local 
stakeholders with alternative income sources from the sustainable utilization of 
resources.
6 Projects are many and varied and can be found in countries around the 
world (Edmonds 2002).  
Given typically weak though highly variable de jure property rights, and more 
generally weak governance structures within developing countries, it can be difficult 
to assess the effectiveness of co-management. Even the definition of success varies 
across settings and across stakeholder groups within a given setting, although 
protection of natural resources and sustainable local livelihoods are often central to 
the discussion. 
Evaluating effectiveness by inspecting just the forest and other outcomes of 
co-management can easily be confounded by the determinants of where co-
management arises as a strategy. If co-management only arises when a protected area 
authority in fact has the ability to ‘fence & fine’ to keep pristine forest, then co-
management may be highly correlated with but not responsible for maintenance of 
forest. In the opposite extreme, positive livelihood outcomes could correlate with co-
management if this institution arises in cases in which protection is more like a ‘paper 
tiger’ and consumption is unbounded. 
Along those lines, this paper aims to predict and study the emergence of such 
negotiated agreements to share the management of as well as the benefits from forest.  
First, we develop a conceptual framework for understanding roles of co-management 
interventions. Second, we bring to our derived hypotheses unique panel data collected 
from a co-management policy implemented in Lore Lindu National Park, Indonesia. 
                                                 
5 That does not mean it is always expected to ‘work’. Larson and Ribot 2004 discuss preconditions for 
effective co-management including secure and well-defined property rights, transfer of appropriate and 
sufficient powers to communities, and downwardly accountable and representative local institutions. 
 
6 Naturally these objective are not always achieved. Bulte and Engel (2007) review evidence showing 
that devolution has in cases been more a transfer of responsibilities than a transfer of rights, for 
instance, an outsourcing of costs while maintaining control. Community rights may still be weakly 
defined and only rarely enforced while governments maintain control through extensive bureaucratic 
procedures as well as the withholding of information and a lack of capacity building. Empirical study is 
critical for evaluation. 
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Starting on the conceptual side, we develop a simple game-theoretic model of 
an interaction between a protected area authority and a local community residing on 
periphery of a park. A critical point is that property rights over the park’s natural 
resources are endogenous. The model is adapted from previous work by Engel, López 
and Palmer (2006) and Engel and Lopez (2008), which consider the interaction 
between resource-dependent communities and resource-extraction firms in a context 
of weak property rights. There the firm—by commercially extracting the resources—
limits the community from benefiting from the standing forest. In our case, the park—
by preventing extraction—limits the community from exploiting park resources. 
We consider de facto property rights as an outcome of the interaction between 
the park and community. In contrast, previous studies of co-management assume that 
property rights over protected area resources are exogenous. For example, Barrett and 
Arcese (1998) and Skonhoft and Solstad (1996; 1998) consider the effects of a co-
management intervention on illegal hunting and wildlife conservation. In these two 
studies either the local households or the park agency, respectively in each paper, has 
full control over the wildlife stock. Another example is a model by Johannesen and 
Skonhoft (2005) which assumes that both the park agency and local people control 
wildlife. Still rights are exogenous but now actors are strategically interdependent. 
  Gjertsen and Barratt (2004) offer a different sort of example. They develop a 
contracting model of conservation design, in which specific conservation tasks such 
as financing and management are efficiently allocated between a community and a 
government according to the prevailing biophysical, economic and socio-political 
conditions. Co-management is one outcome of the model, although all of the possible 
outcomes can be interpreted as conservation outcomes. Here, unlike in our model, 
property rights are still given exogenously. Also, again in contrast with our model, 
there is no potential for a non-conservation outcome, e.g. in which a park fails to have 
any influence on the forest outcomes (as in the ‘paper tiger’ scenario we describe). 
Muller and Albers’ (2004) more general model features a developing country 
protected-area manager interacting with local households in various market settings.
 
This model has significant commonalities with ours, despite their different emphases. 
Two important differences stand out. First, our model assumes no external, third-party 
enforcement; instead, everything needs to be self-enforced. Second, we believe that 
the corner solutions in the model are important options to consider for explaining an 
observed reality. This expansion of explicit foci matters for some differences in result.   4
In our model there are three outcomes. First, complete forest protection where 
the park claims de facto property rights, leading to a ‘Fences-&-Fines Park’. Second, 
a situation of open access, where property rights are de facto claimed by communities 
which implies ‘Paper Tiger Parks’. Thirdly, a negotiated or co-management outcome, 
between the park and the community, in which the park authorities effectively claim 
de facto rights but the relevant local communities still benefit from direct-use values 
from the resource in exchange for taking on management responsibilities in the park.  
These predictions are examined for Lore Lindu National Park in Sulawesi, 
Indonesia. In the wake of decentralization in Indonesia’s natural resource sectors at 
the end of the 1990s, and local demand for a share of resource rents, the head of Lore 
Lindu pioneered a new policy known as ‘Community Conservation Agreement’ 
(Kesepakatan Konservasi Masyarakat, or KKM). Promoted by NGOs, these were 
agreements negotiated between community representatives and the park authorities 
that attempted to strike a balance between nature conservation and the communities’ 
development needs (Mappatoba 2004).  
Within a KKM, communities benefit from the use of park resources, e.g. via 
limited timber extraction and the collection of NTFP such as plant fibres and rattan. 
They are contracted to manage areas that approximate long-standing resource claims.  
Uniquely and in contrast to previous studies, we empirically test the theoretical 
predictions from our model using field data collected from Lore Lindu. Our empirical 
results cover four hypothesis sets derived from the conceptual model. 
First, we compare community means of proxies for our model’s parameters to 
examine consistency with the predictions from the conflict part of our model 
determining which actor has de facto rights (meaning the park can impose a Fences-
and-Fines outcome if it has rights or the locals can make the park a Paper Tiger). 
Second, we compare the means of proxies for the subset of communities where the 
Park has effectively claimed de facto rights, i.e. between communities that negotiated 
KKM and those that did not, i.e. where a default Fences-and-fines outcome is 
imposed by the Park. Third, we compare the means of proxies for subgroup of 
communities that have KKMs, to examine consistency with predictions about 
transfers to community within the agreements. Finally, we test for the degree of forest 
use permitted under a KKM with respect to the level of forest benefits from 
conservation and the net benefits from forest extraction. The results broadly support 
our model predictions, although there is mixed evidence in some cases, possibly due  5
to the fact that our relatively rough data proxies often correlate with several model 
parameters.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents our model of the 
bargaining process, in which de facto property rights arise based on other parameters, 
and derives hypotheses concerning the kinds of agreements that one can expect to see. 
Section 3 provides background on the Indonesian setting. Section 4 then provides our 
comparison of the unique KKM data set with the model-based hypotheses. Finally, 
Section 5 discusses and points to potential further work. 
 
2.  Model 
We present a game-theoretic model of community-park interaction in a 
context of weak property rights. This model is adapted from Engel, López and Palmer 
(2006) and Engel and López (2008). The model integrates conflict and bargaining 
theories. Below, the conflict-and-rights component of the model is discussed first. 
 
2.1  Conflict Determines Endogenous Property Rights 
In Engel, López and Palmer (2006), de facto property rights are modeled as the 
outcome of a war of attrition between a commercial actor (e.g., a logging company) 
and a resource owner (the community). We adapt their model to co-management of 
protected areas. Our two actors are ‘park authority’ (or P or ‘Park’) and ‘Community’ 
(C). The resource is ‘forest’. In Engel et al. (2006), the possibility of bargaining is 
developed in a context of resource exploitation, logging. In our context, bargaining 
occurs over the environmental benefits of ‘forest conservation’ (see next sub-section).  
Park has de jure property rights over the forest but may only be able to enforce 
these weakly, e.g. due to a lack of funds and manpower to monitor large remote areas. 
These rights are challenged by local people with long-standing claims to the resources 
in the park. Each of the actors could obtain de facto forest-control rights.  Community 
may unilaterally exploit the forest if it has the power to win a war of attrition. Park 
may prevent that if it is more powerful. If Park cannot effectively enforce its legal 
property rights, it cannot exclude Community from using park resources. If, on the 
other hand, Community is unable to win a potential conflict, i.e. if Park can 
effectively prevent exploitation, then bargaining between Community and Park may 
take place over a co-management agreement to share conservation benefits. For  6
simplicity, we assume that each actor is risk neutral and has perfect information about 
the other’s parameters.
7. 
Let  ) ( L L v − denote the per-period environmental benefits from conservation 
given forest extraction L, with L denoting the initial level of forest as area.
8 We 
assume that v is increasing and concave in  L L − ,  ) 0 , 0 ( < ′ ′ > ′ v v .   
Community attempts to break park rules through, for example, collection of 
fuelwood, hunting, small-scale logging and the harvesting of rattan. These yield direct 
use values (and require little capital investment).
 9 Let b(L) denote the per-period net 
benefits of forest exploitation to Community, e.g. from timber and rattan sales (which 
reduce the forest level by L). We assume that b is increasing and concave in L, 
) 0 , 0 ( < ′ ′ > ′ b b  and b(0) = 0. The discount rate of actor i is denoted r
i  (i∈⎨C, P⎬).  
In general, a conflict game is won by the party able to stay in the potential 
conflict longer. The conflict game between Community and Park is seen in Figure 1. 
In each period, Community can attempt to exploit park resources by investing effort 
in extraction of forest products. Park, in turn, can attempt to enforce control over the 
forest by setting up monitoring and enforcement to prevent resource extraction. If the 
Park loses this conflict and withdraws, then a situation arises that we characterize as a 
‘Paper Tiger’ (PT) park. If, on the other hand, Community loses the conflict, Park is 
able to enforce a ‘Fences and Fines’ (FF) situation. As will be shown in section 2.2,  
in this case Park may eventually opt for a co-management agreement instead. We 
assume that a co-management agreement is only an option when Park wins a potential 
conflict, not when the community can claim de facto property rights over the forest. 
This assumption is made because any such co-management agreement would not be 
enforceable by the Park in the case where the Park cannot win a potential conflict. To 
                                                 
7 This implies that the actor that would lose the conflict withdraws immediately. With imperfect 
information, actual conflict is possible, but the outcome will generally depend on the same parameters 
listed here (see Burton (2004) for a related model with imperfect information). 
 
8 While the environmental benefits from protecting standing forest in a park can be interpreted as 
nonuse values, say for biodiversity and other non-local externalities, the extent of benefits considered 
by park authorities will depend on the eventual beneficiaries. If the park is, for example, established 
and run by a central government, then the beneficiaries will be those in the national society. In this case 
global public goods such as the carbon sequestration function of biomass may assume less importance 
than say scenic beauty. 
 
9  The Community may also consider ecological services from the standing forest (e.g., erosion 
prevention, water retention) as well as non-use values (e.g., the cultural value of living near a forest). 
For simplicity, we assume a zero value of non-use values to the Community. 
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be enforceable in this case, a co-management agreement would have to be in the form 
of a conditional payment. This would require a multi-period model that is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Moreover, such conditional payments were not observed in our 
field setting in Indonesia. They may, however, be relevant in other settings and thus, 
allowing for this possibility would be an interesting extension to our model.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
With perfect information, both actors can perfectly predict conflict outcomes. 
Hence, the actor who would lose the conflict withdraws immediately.
10 A PT outcome 
has no monitoring or enforcement and high Community forest extraction (denoted 
below by L = L
~
). A FF outcome has no extraction by Community (L = 0) and high 
monitoring/enforcement by Park.  Staying in conflict one more period means that both 
actors incur costs and benefits. Park incurs the costs of the monitoring and 
enforcement, K, and receives per-period conservation benefit  ) (L v v ≡ . For 
Community, there is a cost of attempting to withdraw forest products, denoted as e(L), 
which is given by the value of the effort (opportunity cost of time) spent in the 
attempt. We assume that e is convex in L (e’>0, e’’>0).Without Park enforcement, 
Community will chose  L
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~ >  the Community never enters into a conflict 
because the cost of extraction for a single period exceeds the value of exploiting park 
resources forever. So long as the Park’s net benefits from forest conservation remain 
positive, i.e.,  K
r
v
P > , Park will always win the conflict and will establish de facto 
property rights over the forest. Second, if  b e
~ ~ < , Community will always extract 
because the benefits from doing so exceed the costs even in the same period. Third, 






> > , or equivalently, 
C r e b e ~ ~ ~ > > , the conflict is won by the actor that 
can stay in conflict longer. The conflict outcome in this case is obtained by computing 
for each actor the maximum length of time that this actor can stay in conflict while 
still receiving a non-negative expected payoff. Let these be denoted by 
C t  and 
P t  for 
                                                 
10 To model actual conflict in terms of imperfect enforcement and ongoing violations of Park rules by 
the Community would require introducing imperfect information. This would make the model 
considerably more complex and is beyond the scope of this paper.  8
the community and the Park, respectively. Setting 
P C t t ) (< > , the condition for the 
Community (respectively the Park) to win the conflict is obtained.  
In analogy to Engel et al. (2006), who provide a formal proof of these results 
for their model of community-firm conflicts, it can be said that Park is more likely to 
win the conflict (thus obtaining de facto property rights over the forest and being able 
to enforce a fences-and-fines situation) when the following conditions prevail: 
  the conservation benefits from the protected park resources (v ) are high 
(e.g. in an area of national importance due to large biodiversity values or 
one which could potentially receive payments for environmental services) 
  Park’s costs (K) of monitoring and enforcing a FF situation are low   
  Community’s extraction costs (e ~ ) are high 
  Community’s benefits from forest extraction (b
~
) are low (e.g., low 
dependence on forest for livelihoods or less valuable rattan or timber are 
harvested), 
  Park’s discount rate is low and/or the Community’s discount rate is high. 
These results are very intuitive. An actor is likely to be able to stay in conflict longer 
the higher are his benefits and the lower are his costs from doing so. Moreover, since 
benefits are received over time while fighting costs are immediate, each actor is likely 
to stay in conflict longer the lower his discount rate. 
If Park wins the conflict game, it can enforce a FF situation. In this case Park 
payoffs per period are given by  K v − , while the community’s benefits from the park 
are zero. However, in this case, Park and Community may negotiate a co-management 
agreement (see section 2.2 below) where Park delegates monitoring and enforcement 
of park rules to Community and allows some limited extraction of park resources. 
If the Community wins the conflict game, a PT situation results. In this case, 
the community’s per-period net benefits from forest extraction are  e b ~ ~
− , while Park 
receives reduced conservation benefits of v ~ . As explained in footnote (10), in this 
case a co-management agreement would not be enforceable in our simple model 
without conditional periodic payments. Table 1 shows the payoff matrix for all three 
possible outcomes. The case of a co-management agreement is discussed next. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
2.2   Community-Park Negotiation Under De Facto Park Rights 
Here we focus on cases where the Park is able to self-enforce property rights,  9
imposing FF, yet bargaining may lead to a co-management agreement. We refer to a 
co-management agreement as KKM, using terminology from our Indonesian example 
presented in the following section. The negotiated transfer from Park to Community 
under an agreement is denoted Π
C, while s denotes Community’s costs of setting up 
an internal monitoring and sanctioning system that substitutes for Park’s efforts.  
An important argument for co-management agreements or, more generally, 
decentralized natural resource management, is that it may be less costly for local 
communities to monitor and enforce resource use rules because they can rely on local 
knowledge and traditional monitoring and enforcement mechanisms (e.g., ostracism). 
Thus, it may well be that s<K, inducing an incentive for Park authorities to consider a 
co-management agreement, in which it trades reduced monitoring and enforcement 
costs (by devolving management responsibilities to the Community) for some 
(limited) resource extraction rights (denoted by forest extraction level  L ˆ >0).  
Following Engel et al. (2006), we model negotiation over a co-management 
agreement between the Park and the Community as Nash bargaining. As shown in 
Muthoo (1999), the Nash bargaining solution implies that each actor receives his 
reservation utility and a share of the remainder of ‘the cake’ that is inversely related to 
his bargaining power. We let τ denote Community’s bargaining power and 1-τ Firm’s 
bargaining power.  Moreover, let  ) ˆ ( ˆ L L v v − ≡ ,  ) ˆ ( ˆ L b b ≡ , and  ) ˆ ( ˆ L e e ≡  .  
In our model, Community payoffs under the co-management agreement are 
given by  
C s e b Π + − − ˆ ˆ . Community’s reservation utility is zero, as we focus on 
when Park would win a potential conflict. Park’s reservation utility is  K v − . Total 
benefits to divide under a co-management agreement are  s e b v − − + ˆ ˆ ˆ . Thus, the Nash 
bargaining solution is given by 
( ) [ ] K v s e b v s e b
C − − − − − + + = Π + − − 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 ˆ ˆ τ  
[] [ ] s e b v v K
C − − − − − − = Π ⇒ ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ) ˆ ( τ τ      ( 2 )  
Furthermore, note negotiations over a co-management agreement will succeed 
only if the size of the cake exceeds the sum of both actors’ reservation utility, i.e., if  
() . 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ > − − − − + K v s e b v        ( 3 )  
Thus, a KKM is more likely to result when the loss in the conservation benefits from 
forest extraction ( v v ˆ − ) and/or the Community’s costs of monitoring and enforcement 
(s) are low, or when Community’s net benefits from resource extraction ( e b ˆ ˆ− ) and/or  10
the Park’s costs of enforcing a Fences-and-Fines outcome (K) are relatively high. 
  The allowed forest extraction level under a co-management agreement, L ˆ , 
would be chosen by the two parties in order to maximize the ‘size of the cake’. 
  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ' ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( max
ˆ L b L e L L v s L e L b L L v
L
′ = + − ′ ⇒ − − + −      (4) 
Comparing conditions (1) and (4) yields that  
L L
~ ˆ 0 < < ,            ( 5 )  
i.e. forest extraction will be lower under a co-management agreement than under a PT 
situation. This is so because a co-management agreement takes the reduction in 
conservation benefits into account. A formal proof of inequality (5) is given in 
Appendix A.  
Intuitively, starting from the default outcome of FF, the total ‘agreement cake’ 
to divide in negotiations for co-management are the net benefits from allowing some 
level of extraction while reducing the monitoring and enforcement effort by Park from 
what was required to enforce FF. As the marginal enforcement costs to fully prevent 
extraction could be high and the marginal benefits of the first units of extraction could 
also be high, agreement may be desirable. To agree, then, would allow Community to 
capture limited direct use value (timber, NTFP, etc). In return, the Community would 
be taking on limited management and enforcement responsibilities for the Park. 
  There may also be a transfer involved. Examining (2) shows that the transfer 
to the Community (
C Π ) rises with community bargaining power (
C τ ), Park costs of 
enforcement (K), and Community enforcement costs (s). It falls with the conservation 
benefits lost under a KKM ( v v ˆ − ) and Community net benefits from extraction ( e b ˆ ˆ− ). 
In principle, the transfer (Π
C ) may be positive or negative. Coasian thinking 
could have Community pay Park to desert the FF result that the Park has the (de facto) 
right to impose. That would be a negative transfer, which could take the form of Park 
keeping part of the benefits of extraction, e.g. by retaining a portion of the NTFP 
collected by the Community. While not observed in our Indonesian setting, transfers 
from Community to Park have been observed in other settings, such as India’s Joint 
Forest Management programme and a Participatory Forest Management program in 
Ethiopia.
11 
In the model,  0 < Π
C  if  [] [ ] s e b v v K − − − < − − ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( ) ˆ ( τ τ . This is more likely 
                                                 
11 For example, see Behera and Engel (2006) and Rustagi, Kosfeld and Engel (2009).  11
for small K  (i.e., monitoring costs are less of the ‘agreement cake’), or for  v v ˆ −  or 
e b ˆ ˆ−  large (i.e., Community really wants to extract some of the natural resources, but 
this induces a high loss in conservation value), or if s is small (i.e., Community 
monitoring is very cost effective).  
 
2.3  Hypotheses  
  The model results derived in sections 2.1 and 2.2 can be summarized in four 
sets of hypotheses, which we will test with data from Indonesia in section 4. 
 
Set A (from conflict game) 
  Park has   
de facto rights 
(yielding FF  
or a KKM) 
Community has 
de facto rights 
(yielding PT) 
v   High Low 
K    Low High 
e ~   High Low 
b
~  Low High 
r
C  High Low 
 
r
P  Low High 
 
Empirically, as we have attempted below in Section 4, these predictions from the 
model can be examined for our case by comparing values of parameters listed in the 
table between a group of observations consisting of both FF and KKM together with 
the group of PT.  
  12




e b ˆ ˆ−   Relatively lower  Relatively higher 
K  Relatively lower  Relatively higher 
s  Relatively higher  Relatively lower 
 
v v ˆ −   Relatively higher  Relatively lower 
These predictions from the model can be examined by comparing the means of these 
parameters across the group of observed FF and the group of observed KKM. 
 
Set C (size of co-management transfers to the Community (Π
C), from equation (2)) 
Outcomes 
Parameters 
KKM transfer  
to Community 
is greater if: 
τ Higher 
K   Higher 
v v ˆ −   Lower 
e b ˆ ˆ−   Lower 
 
s  Higher 
These predictions from the model can be examined by comparing listed parameters 
between subgroups of the group of observed KKM, specifically those communities 
receiving agricultural/development benefits in agreements and those which did not. 
 
3.  The Indonesian Park Setting 
  We present background about Lore Lindu National Park in Indonesia, which 
includes information on the surveys and methods used to gather data in the area. 
Following that, we provide some context for better understanding of the negotiated 
KKM agreements along with some basic statistics related to the observed agreements. 
  13
3.1  Lore Lindu National Park (LLNP) 
LLNP covers a mountainous area of over 200,000 ha dominated by primary 
and secondary forest, in the province of Central Sulawesi. The region is renowned for 
its unique biodiversity. LLNP is an identified core area for protection of the Wallacea 
biodiversity hotspot (Myers et al., 2000; Achard et al., 2002) with over 200 bird 
species observed, 77 endemic to Sulawesi (Waltert et al., 2004; 2005).  
By combining three protected areas, established between 1973 and 1981, 
Indonesia’s government officially founded LLNP in 1993 (Birner and Mappatoba, 
2003). From 1993 onwards, land that was customarily used by local communities has 
been converted into Park territory, with a few villages moved out of the park to its 
borders (Mappotoba, 2004). Despite decentralization of broad swathes of government 
after the fall of Suharto in 1998, all of the National Parks are still run by central 
government (specifically the Ministry of Forestry) from Jakarta. Central government 
holds de jure property rights to all natural resources, with strict rules prohibiting 
village forest use in the Park. Land use rights in local communities tend to be based 
on traditional adat rights (village customary law). 
There are 60 villages located close to the borders of LLNP, with another seven 
concentrated in two enclaves inside the Park’s borders (see Figure 2). The provincial 
capital, Palu, is close to the northern end of LLNP, with relatively good roads linking 
it to many of the 60 villages. Agriculture is the primary source of income for most  
households with paddy rice as the principal food crop and cocoa and coffee identified 
as the most important cash crops (Maertens et al., 2006).
12 Agricultural expansion has 
been identified as one of the primary drivers of deforestation in LLNP (Maertens, 
2003).  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
Beginning in 1999, and on the initiative of the head of the LLNP at that time, 
Community Conservation Agreements (Kesepakatan Konservasi Masyarakat (KKM)) 
were established as a strategy for Park authorities and local communities to jointly co-
manage forest inside Park borders. Mediated by local and international NGOs, KKM 
were negotiated to resolve conflicts between communities’ needs and conservation’s 
demands (Mappatoba, 2004). Overall, the aim of the KKM is to overcome the major 
threats to LLNP, i.e. forest conversion inside the Park for agricultural land, rattan 
                                                 
12 Average percentages of community-level production that goes to market for the most important crops 
grown are: 29.5% for rice, 68% for corn, 73.6% for coffee, and 92% for cocoa.  14
extraction, logging, hunting of protected endemic animals, and the collection of eggs 
of the protected maleo bird (ANZDEC 1997). Long-standing community claims to 
Park forest resources were recognized in exchange for communities undertaking 
responsibilities towards Park protection and management. While de jure property 
rights to forest land stayed with the Indonesian government, limited forest use rights 
for communities were tacitly institutionalized in the KKM.
13  
As part of a long-running interdisciplinary research programme known as 
Stability of Rainforest Margins in Indonesia (STORMA),
14 80 out of a total of 119 
communities in the Lore Lindu region were surveyed using a stratified random 
sampling method in 2001 (Zeller et al. 2002). Data were collected on community 
characteristics including demography, household livelihoods, land use and social 
institutions. In 2006 and 2007, this survey was repeated with the same sample, 
although the number of communities surveyed dropped to 72 due to funding and time 
constraints.
15 One major difference was the inclusion of detailed questions on the 
KKM in the 2006-07 survey. Before then, it was not known which villages had 
negotiated agreements with the exception of six villages surveyed previously by 
Mappatoba (2004). Moreover, remote sensing data on land use in Lore Lindu were 
collected by STORMA for 2001-02 and 2006-07. Based on 30 by 30 m pixels, these 
data are divided over a number of land use classes including ‘broadleaved (closed) 
forest’ and ‘mosaic’ (degraded forest and agriculture), alongside a number of 
agricultural land uses. Finally, a map of community land claims was overlaid on a 
land use map using data collected in a comprehensive five-year mapping project 
undertaken between 1998 and 2003 (Mappatoba, 2004).
16  
 
3.2  KKMs (community co-management agreements negotiated in LLNP) 
A total of 50 communities claim forest inside LLNP. All claim forest outside 
LLNP as well. Of these, 28 negotiated KKM with the Park, with local and/or 
                                                 
13 Via an interpretation of Indonesia’s 1999 Forestry Law made by the then head of LLNP (Mappatoba, 
2004). The law gave substantial decision-making powers to local governments, and formalized 
community use rights to forest resources (Palmer and Engel, 2007).  
14 STORMA is a collaborative research programme between Indonesian and German universities - the 
Agricultural Institute Bogor (Bogor, Java), Tadulako University (Palu, Sulawesi), University of Kassel 
and Georg-August-University Goettingen. Since 2000, research has focused on processes and factors of 
the stability and dynamics of rainforest margins. 
15 All those dropped from the survey in 2006 were ones located furthest away from the Park, with little 
or no dependence on Park resources and no land claims within the borders of LLNP. 
16 Coordinated by the provincial authorities of Central Sulawesi, the project was funded by the Asian 
Development Bank.   15
international NGOs as facilitators. These NGOs have differing policy objectives with 
many having operated in the community prior to negotiation of the KKM (Mappatoba, 
2004). The first KKM was piloted in 1998 by a local NGO known as the Free Earth 
Foundation (YTM) that emphasized indigenous land- and forest-use rights. YTM is 
involved in facilitating agreements in a further six communities - of which four were 
facilitated in collaboration with other NGOs. Another local NGO,  JAMBATA, has a 
more environmental focus and strong links to the international development NGO 
CARE. It also works in a relatively small number of communities in this area, in this 
case six total of which three were co-facilitated.  
The NGO responsible for facilitating the majority of agreements is the Nature 
Conservancy (TNC), an international conservation NGO. It has worked with LLNP on 
conservation management plans since 1992. The 21 agreements promoted by TNC, 
and sometimes co-facilitated with JAMBATA or YTM, had a high level of detail on 
resource-use regulations and were adapted to a village’s conditions. Negotiations were 
typically concluded and agreements acknowledged by the Park within the same year.  
The typical KKM process involved facilitators and communities working 
together to map and to plan as well as to draft the KKM. Mapping was undertaken in 
24 (86 %) of cases. The park authority was usually in attendance during this process; 
local government was present in fewer cases. By 2006, 24 KKM (86 %) had been 
formally recognized by the park authorities. In general, KKM agreements allowed 
communities the ‘right’ to remain settled within LLNP (for those yet to be resettled 
outside) and the authority to manage natural resources in LLNP (following traditional 
village institutions and customary use rights) in exchange for community commitment 
to implement a forest management plan and to enforce this effectively. Traditional 
forest rights were agreed on in 22 KKM (79 %), while a permission to remain in a 
community’s current location was agreed in 16 KKM (57 %). Agricultural assistance 
was agreed upon in 13 cases (46 %). The most common rules agreed on in KKM 
include: limits on the amount of timber to be harvested (56 %); restrictions on forest 
conversion to agriculture (64 %); restrictions on plantation development (57 %); 
restrictions on the harvesting, use an sale of rattan (57 %); and, restrictions on the use 
and sale of timber (50 %). All of the communities had or put an enforcement system 
in place. 
  16
4. Empirics  
Our model considered three institutional outcomes. Ranking them from worst 
to best from Community’s perspective in terms of being unlimited in their land uses, 
we discussed a FF result in which the Park blocks forest extraction, then a KKM 
outcome in which the Park could block forest extraction but negotiates a deal with 
Community to allow some extraction and save on monitoring and enforcement, and 
then a PT result in which Park is unable to block, i.e. Community wins.  
  The great strength of our data is the observation and description of the KKMs.  
An immediate challenge, however, is how to distinguish non-KKM institutions. Even 
if all local actors were confident they could identify the FF relative to the PT settings, 
on the basis of their own experiences or anecdotal evidence, we do not observe this 
distinction in the data. 
  At the risk of sweeping in all sorts of heterogeneities, a possibility to which we 
will remain attentive below, for the purposes of examining our model predictions 
concerning the emergence of these three institutions we use the observed rates of 
deforestation to separate the 22 non-KKM communities. Thus if the change in forest 
from 2001 to 2006 is positive (increase in forest area) for a non-KKM observation we 
assign the label FF. If it is negative (deforestation) we assign the label PT. Table 2 
below conveys that there are significant differences across communities labeled in this 
way. It is of potential interest that the KKMs are right in the middle, with rates of 
deforestation statistically significantly above the FF communities and below the PT 
ones.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
4.1  Hypotheses A – Who Wins De Facto Rights? 
Recall the conflict model that determines which actor will be able to impose one of 
the extreme outcomes, i.e. full conservation or full extraction. Not surprisingly, the 
higher v, i.e. the conservation benefits of the park, and/or the lower b, Community 
gains from extraction, the less likely is PT (vis-à-vis the case of FF or KKM), since 
the Park has more to gain and the Community has less to lose from exclusion. The 
lower is K, i.e. Park’s cost of excluding Community, the more likely is FF. With a war 
of attrition, the higher the Community discount rate the more likely is FF. Finally, the 
higher the Community’s extraction costs e, and the Community’s discount rate r
C, the 
more likely is FF. We look for these patterns in the data. Table 3 compares the means  17
for our proxies, The rationale underlying the proxies used throughout this section can 
be seen in Appendix B. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
  To begin, we consider the conservation benefits of the park, v. The single 
proxy we have for this parameter appears to be significant and consistent with model 
predictions. The more likely a community is in close proximity to an important bird-
watching site, the higher the conservation benefits. The likelihood of proximity to a 
bird-watching site is 0.44 for FF and KKM communities, which is significantly higher 
than that for PT communities, 0.18 (level of significance is indicated in the left-hand, 
i.e. ‘FF & KKM’, column). Birdwatchers also spend money in and around the villages 
located close to these sites. This would imply lower community benefits from 
reducing forest for those communities situated near bird-watching sites (lower b), 
which is predicted to further increase the probability of a PT outcome. The fact that 
some proxies such as proximity to bird-watching site might correlate with more than a 
single parameter is a recurring feature of our analysis. 
  Regarding Park enforcement costs (K), we use proxies corresponding to the 
proportion of Community land that can be characterised as hilly terrain, i.e. over 20° 
(from the GIS data), the mean elevation of community territory above sea level (also 
from GIS data) and proximity to a park ranger office (from survey data). We expect 
that flatter terrain and greater proximity to park rangers’ offices likely lowers K.
17 The 
results support the hypothesis that lower Park enforcement costs reduce the 
probability of a PT outcome, showing significant differences between the two groups. 
Community benefits from reducing forest (b) may also be expected to be higher where 
terrain is flatter. However, our results seem to indicate that this might not be the case 
or that at least this effect is not dominant here. Note that communities cultivate 
agriculture, particularly rice, both on slopes as well as in flatter areas (see Maertens et 
al., 2006). 
  Considering next the community benefits from extraction, five of our proxies 
for b exhibit significant differences between the values in the two columns, supporting 
the model’s predictions, and three more have a consistent direction of effect. When a 
higher share of the village migrates, there is relatively less value in extracting from 
                                                 
17  Also, it seems that being within reach of Palu and the provincial government matters. Communities 
with FF/KKM and PT outcomes are, on average, 79 and 110km away from Palu, respectively. This 
difference in significant.   18
the Community perspective, giving the Park a greater chance of claiming de facto 
rights. Also, the prices for rice and coffee are found to be significantly lower in those 
places where it seems Park could exclude. That is consistent with the model, because 
lower prices of these agricultural commodities reduce Community’s incentives to 
convert forest land to agriculture. Prices for rice land are also higher in PT cases, but 
prices for other agricultural land are lower, with neither of these differences being 
statistically significant though. Higher prices of both timber and rattan (high b) are 
also found where the community could exclude with the former being significantly 
different. Significantly greater food shortages are expected to imply higher expected 
benefits from reducing forest for food production. As expected, high livelihood 
dependence on timber is found in PT communities, although the difference to the FF 
and KKM group is not statistically significant.
18  
  Next we consider the community’s expected (opportunity) cost of extraction, 
e. Differences between the two columns for two proxies, the proportion of households 
with off-farm wage labour and the proportion of children between the ages of 13 and 
18, are not significant. That said, the relative sizes of the values in the two columns 
are as expected: opportunity costs might be higher where we find more households in 
off-wage labour and where more children that would otherwise accompany families to 
work in fields and forest are to be found in school. 
  In general, we expect that those communities with higher discount rates prefer 
present to future consumption and hence, are in some sense ‘poorer’ than those with 
lower rates. Robust proxies for Community discount rate are difficult to isolate and 
analyse due to evidence of correlation among these. Credit is a relatively reliable 
proxy for community discount rate, although it should be stressed that there is also 
evidence of bias in the distribution of credit among communities in our sample. For 
instance, poorer communities might be exactly those places targeted by a government 
credit programme. In fact, communities located close to the provincial capital are 
more likely to have a government credit programme in place than those located 
further out of the government’s reach, which would likely lead to a FF result.
19 But, 
                                                 
18 While the numbers of those households who are livelihood-dependent on timber harvesting are 
relatively small, these are included in our analysis due to having a potentially large influence on the 
small deforestation rates observed in our sample. 
19 Access to government credit and other credit with distance of community from Palu are both 
significantly correlated (1% level). Thus, the further away from Palu and outlying areas, the less likely 
a community has access to any kind of credit, which indicates that credit is not randomly distributed 
among villages.   19
on the other hand, we might not expect these places to be poorer than those that are 
unable to access credit markets.  
   
4.2  Hypotheses B – Default Fences vs. Negotiated Comanagement 
Moving to set B, the comparison is between communities that have negotiated 
a KKM (28 communities) and ones where the park excludes, FF (11). Note again that 
these are the communities where the Park has won de facto property rights, i.e. in the 
conflict game. Thus, strict ‘Community wins’, i.e. PT cases are not considered here.  
From Table 4 and beginning with our sole proxy for v, the conservation 
benefits of the park, we find that community proximity to a bird-watching area, while 
showing no significant difference between the two columns appears to be higher 
where the park might exclude altogether (FF).  
TABLE 4 HERE 
Regarding the park’s cost of monitoring and enforcement, K, the amount of 
hilly land appears to be significantly higher where we might expect to find lower 
costs. But if, on the other hand, there is a link between slope and community benefits 
from extraction then this result would be consistent with that. This emphasizes again 
the difficulty in using proxies that may correlate with more than a single parameter, 
i.e. in this case slope might have two effects. The other two proxies appear to have 
relative values as predicted. For mean elevation, land that is closer to sea level 
appears to be cheaper for the park to monitor hence resulting in an outcome where the 
park can exclude the community altogether under a FF strategy. However, this result 
should be treated with caution given the insignificant result for elevation in Set A.  
Considering proxies for b we find, in contrast to the results for the conflict 
game, that our results are not consistent with theory. Only three proxies, food 
shortages, the proportion of community territory inside the park and rattan price, have 
values that are consistent with expectations. In particular, a significantly higher 
proportion of community forest is found in the park where a negotiated co-
management agreement is the outcome. But again we should be cautious given the 
insignificant result for forest in park for Set A. For all the other proxies, similar high 
values are found where we might expect a lower b, i.e. where FF is the outcome.  
The purpose of the statistical tests for Set B, in contrast to Set A, is to 
highlight differences between communities that remain in a FF situation and those in 
which a KKM emerged. Recalling that one of the key features of a KKM is that the  20
Park devolves some monitoring responsibilities (costs) to the Community in exchange 
for limited forest use, the community’s cost of setting up an internal monitoring 
system, s, is of particular interest for Set B. Overall, we find that proxies for s strongly 
support the theoretical predictions. Thus, consistent with much of the collective action 
literature, we find that smaller and significantly more homogenous communities can 
self-monitor at lower cost. Moreover, we find KKM outcomes where there is a 
significantly lower likelihood of previous conflict among households in the 
community, irrespective of whether they are native or not. Land is also an important 
factor with significantly lower proportions of landless villagers and those that have 
sold all land in previous years in KKM communities compared to FF communities. 
The former are the ones that are more able to self-monitor at lower cost. 
 
4.3  Hypotheses C – Transfers Under Co-management 
Like Table 3 and 4, Table 5 compares means for proxies. However, in this 
case we are comparing not KKM versus non-KKM communities, as in Table 3, or 
KKM versus FF communities as in Table 4, but instead subsets of the group of 
communities with KKMs in order to examine whether the data line up with the 
model’s predictions about when a negotiated agreement will involve transfers. 
In principle, such a transfer could be either positive (flowing to Community) 
or negative (flowing to Park). In the Indonesian setting, we observe zero or positive 
flows to Community, but no cases of negative transfers. Moreover, we test our 
hypotheses using proxies on transfers observed from both promises negotiated in 
KKMs and services actually delivered. 
 Specifically, we use a dummy each for promised and delivered agricultural 
development benefits as our two proxies for Π
C. Table 5 examines means by KKM 
subset for v, the conservation benefits of the park, K, the Park’s cost of enforcement, 
b, the Community gains from extraction, s, the Community’s cost of monitoring and 
internal sanction. Moreover, in addition to the parameter sets examined for hypotheses 
sets A and B, here we also include proxies for τ, the Community’s relative bargaining 
power. We discuss values below. Note that the subset of communities being studied is 
now only a sample of 28, which is divided according to (i) whether or not the 
Community received a promise of agricultural development as part of its KKM, and  21
(ii) whether or not the Community actually received any agricultural benefits as a 
result of participating in a KKM.
20  
TABLE 5 HERE 
In contrast to Table 3 and 4, we find mixed evidence in this effort to align  
detailed observations about the terms of the KKM co-management agreements with a 
range of characterization of village setting. Given small sample size, this is perhaps 
unsurprising. For each model parameter, many empirical proxies do not differ by 
group, while some significant differences support the model. First, our results for K 
and v are not convincing, although some directions of effect are as expected. 
 For  b, we find that a transfer is made to the community where there is 
significantly less community forest in the park and with significantly fewer 
households dependent on timber for livelihoods. This last result is reversed when 
rattan is considered as a livelihood strategy as well. Similar results that contradict the 
theory are also found for rice price and loss of harvest due to drought.  
Regarding s, we find that transfers occur where there is a significantly higher 
incidence of conflict between the community and other communities but an opposite 
result when considering intra-community conflict. Intra-community conflict appears 
to have a greater likelihood of occurrence where agricultural benefits were not 
promised, particularly where there is evidence of conflict between native and migrant 
households. This result weakens when we consider actual benefits. Interestingly, 
inter-community conflict appears to have been significantly more likely in 
communities where agricultural benefits were delivered. Where the community was 
more likely to have been formerly part of another community and with more unequal 
land distribution, transfers were likely to have been promised. Both of these 
differences are significant and in line with theory. However, when considering 
communities where agricultural developments actually occurred these results weaken.  
Finally, transfers are expected to occur where community bargaining power τ, 
is found to be higher. According to the data, transfers actually occurred where 
communities are significantly more likely to have previous knowledge of other 
communities moving out of the park due to LLNP enforcing a strict FF regime under 
the Suharto government. Armed with this knowledge, communities are expected to be 
                                                 
20 It should not be assumed that those receiving benefits always received promises originally. Of the 11 
that received benefits, four did not say that these were originally promised. Five of the 13 that were 
promised benefits had not received anything at the time of the survey.  22
a stronger position to negotiate higher levels of rents from the KKM. Moreover, 
bargaining power is higher where the NGO is known to be concerned with forest 
degradation and where the community is less likely to make an explicit claim to forest 
inside the park. Knowing that the NGO is keen to prevent degradation and/or not 
showing an early hand in laying claim to forest early on in KKM negotiations might 
strengthen the community’s bargaining power in extracting rents. All these variables 
are found to be significant. Other variables show weaker links to the theory. 
 
 5. Discussion and Conclusions – Still need to be written out 
 
•  Recap to argument in the intro that evaluating effectiveness of co-management 
agreements by inspecting just the forest and other outcomes of co-management 
can easily be confounded by the determinants of where co-management arises as a 
strategy.  
•  Our theoretical results indicate that co-management is likely to arise where a 
protected area authority in fact has the ability to ‘fence & fine’ to keep pristine 
forest. KKMs are rather then just a means of reducing monitoring costs for the 
Park  
•  This implies that co-management may be highly correlated with but not 
responsible for maintenance of forest. In fact, the introduction of co-management 
in this case reduces environmental quality as compared to the baseline outcome of 
full conservation. Thus, the effectiveness of co-management agreements in 
promoting forest conservation may be overestimated. 
•  comparison of the model’s predictions with a unique data set on KKMs in the 
Lore Lindu National Park in Sulawesi, Indonesia broadly supports the hypotheses 
derived from the theoretical model, although some difficulties arise from the fact 
that the same proxies often relate to several parameters simultaneously. 
•  Our theoretical model also explains variation in KKM terms as the result of a 
negotiation process that depends on bargaining power and fallbacks. 
•  The model results indicate that transfers within co-management agreements can in 
principle be positive or negative. While no negative transfers were observed in the 
Indonesian data, other studies have indicated evidence of negative transfers in co-
management initiatives in India and Ethiopia. Testing model predictions using, for  23
example, data from different Indian states, which exhibit a large variation in 
transfers within the country’s Joint Forest Management Program could be an 
interesting extension for further research. 
•  emergence of KKM involve underlying de facto rights and thus fallback positions; 
in our model, KKM emerges only if Park has potential to enforce rights; in reality, 
imperfect information may result in KKMs being attempted in areas where 
community can win a potential conflict yet our model implies that KKMs are 
unlikely to be effective in this situation, unless they can be implemented 
conditional on performance; that requires periodic transfers and monitoring of 
forest outcomes (Participatory Forest management program in Ethiopia actually 
has both:  state management was not working before program was introduced 
(PT)) 
•  Further ideas for future extensions: 
- allow for imperfect information. This would help to explain observed variations 
between promised and actual transfers. 
-allow for conditional transfers a la PES. This would introduce the option of co-
management agreements in situations where the community has de facto rights to 
the forest (PT case). Though conditional payments were not observed in the 
Indonesian setting, PES are becoming increasingly popular, making this an 
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Figure 2: Map of the study area 
 
 
Source: Stability of Rainforest Margins in Indonesia (STORMA) 










TABLE 1: Payoff Matrix for Model Outcomes 
  Payoff to P  Payoff to C 
IF PARK (P) WINS POTENTIAL CONFLICT: 
Fences-&-Fines (FF) 
(high enforcement,  
no extraction tolerated) 
K L v − ) (   0 
Co-management agreement (KKM) 
(Park saves on 
monitoring/enforcement by devolving 
these tasks to Community  
in return for some Community 
extraction & possibly a transfer (it 
could be + or -) 
C L L v Π − − ) ˆ ( 
C s L e L b Π + − − ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 
IF COMMUNITY (C) WINS POTENTIAL CONFLICT*: 
Paper Tiger park (PT)  )
~




( L e L b −  




TABLE 2:  Labelling Communities  
Average rates of change in forest in KKM and non-KKM outcomes (labels applied) 
 ‘FF’  KKM  ‘PT’ 
Number of communities  11  28  11 
L (rate of change in forest cover 
within the park, 2001-06) 
7.268*** -0.257**  -6.360*** 
Note: Significance of differences between means are indicated in KKM column for KKM versus. PT, 
in FF column for KKM versus FF, and in PT column for PT versus FF: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1  31
TABLE 3: Comparing Means Set A -- FF & KKM versus PT 
(using independent samples t-tests to indicate significance) 
(yellow highlighting for consistency with hypotheses) 
   
FF & KKM (39)  PT (11) 
 
v(L) (conservation benefits of park) 
 
 
expect v higher 
 
expect v lower 
Neighbouring a prime bird watching area  0.44*  0.18 
 
K (park’s cost of monitor/enforce) 
 
expect K lower 
 
 
expect K higher 
Neighbouring a park ranger office
ϒ  0.69**  0.27 
Mean % hilly area (>20°)   9.92*  11.34 
Mean elevation (m above sea level)  1,186  1,135  
 
b (community’s benefits from use) 
 
expect b lower 
 
 
expect b higher 
Food shortages, 1980-2001 (1 = yes)  0.64**  0.91 
Max % loss of harvest due to drought, 
1980-2001 
51.67  63.18 
% village temporary outmigrants, 2001
ϒ  2.46**  0.35  
% of community area located inside park  62.87  47.67  
% principle livelihood from timber 2001  0.56  0.89  
% principle livelihood rattan and timber  5.77  2.39  
Price rice, Rp per kg, 2001  2,152**   2,482  
Price coffee, Rp per kg, 2001  4,324**   5,510  
Price rice land (rice), Rp per ha, 2001  9,226,600   9,500,000  
Price land (other ag), Rp per ha, 2001  12,240,800   9,931,800  
Rattan price, per kg, 2001  625  707 
Timber price, per m3, 2001  516,053***  668,182 
 
e   (community’s extraction costs) 
 
expect e higher 
 
 
expect e lower 
% households with ’01 off-farm earners   6.82  6.43 
% of children 13-18 in school, 2001  40.12  31.31 
 
r
C (community’s discount rate) 
 
expect r higher 
 
 
expect r lower 
Government/NGO credit programme, 
1980-2001 (1 = yes) 
0.93** 
(see note below) 
0.64 
(see note below) 
Other credit programme, 1980-2001  0.46  0.27 
Note:  Receiving such credit is highly correlated with being close to the Park HQ (i.e., monitorable). 
Significant differences between means of variables listed in the first column (‘FF&KKM)’) and the 
second (‘PT’) are indicated in the first column: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1 
ϒ Indicates that proxy is inversely related to the parameter of interest, so that the predicted direction of 
the correlation is reversed. (For example, neighboring park ranger office proxies for lower K, therefore 
a higher value is expected for FF and KKM than for PT communities in this case.) See also Appendix 
B.
Comment [StE1]: Not clear 
which row this note relates to.  32
TABLE 4: Comparing Means Set B -- FF versus KKM 
(using independent samples t-tests to indicate significance) 
(yellow highlighting for consistency with hypotheses) 
   
FF (11)  KKM (28) 
 
v(L) (conservation benefits of park) 
 
 
expect v higher 
 
expect v lower 
Neighbouring a prime bird watching area  0.45  0.42 
 
K (park’s cost of monitor/enforce) 
 
expect K lower 
 
 
expect K higher 
Neighbouring a park ranger office
ϒ  0.73   0.67  
Mean % hilly area (>20°)   12.56***  8.94 
Mean elevation (m above sea level)  998**  1,256  
 
b (community’s benefits from use) 
 
expect b lower 
 
 
expect b higher 
Food shortages, 1980-2001 (1 = yes)  0.55  0.68 
Max % loss of harvest due to drought, 
1980-2001 
56.36 49.82 
% village temporary outmigrants, 2001
ϒ 0.877*  3.08 
% of community area located inside park  46.89**  69.15 
% principle livelihood from timber 2001  1.68*  0.13 
% principle livelihood rattan and timber  12.10*  3.28 
Price rice, Rp per kg, 2001  2,186  2,139 
Price coffee, Rp per kg, 2001  5,000  4,174 
Price rice land (rice), Rp per ha, 2001  12,028,000  8,423,900 
Price land (other ag), Rp per ha, 2001  20,350,000**  9,366,600 
Rattan price, per kg, 2001  616  630 
Timber price, per m3, 2001  519,815 514,815 
s   (community’s cost of setting up 
internal monitoring system) 
 
expect s higher 
 
expect s lower 
# hh, 2001  365.09  252.00 
% hh natives, 2001
ϒ  71.99*  85.89 
Evidence of conflict among native hh in 
community, 1995-2001 (1 = yes) 
0.91*  0.64 
Evidence of conflict between native & 
migrant hh in community, 1995-2001 (1 
= yes) 
0.45*  0.18 
Evidence of conflict with hh from 
another village, 1995-2001 (1 = yes) 
0.36  0.29 
%HH sold all land, 1995-2001  2.78**  0.55 
%HH with no land, 2001  10.91*  3.57 
Land distribution, 2001 (Gini)   0.406  0.385 
Village previously part of another village 
(1 = yes) 
0.36  0.18 
%working population in labour sharing
ϒ  21.31  22.98  33
groups 
Note:  Significant differences between means of variables listed in the first column (‘FF’) and the 
second (‘KKM’) are indicated in the first column: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1 
ϒ Indicates that proxy is inversely related to the parameter of interest, so that the predicted direction of 
the correlation is reversed. (For example, neighboring park ranger office proxies for lower K, therefore 
a higher value is expected for FF and KKM than for PT communities in this case.) See also Appendix 
B. 
 
TABLE 5: Comparing Means Set C -- KKMs with and without Transfers 
(using independent samples t-tests to indicate significance) 
(yellow highlighting for consistency with hypotheses) 
   
KKM (promised)  KKM (delivered) 














) (L v lower 
expect 
) (L v higher 
expect 
) (L v lower 
expect 
) (L v higher 
Neighbouring prime bird watching 
area (1 = yes) 
0.54 0.33 0.27  0.53 








Mean % hilly area (<20°)   9.05  8.85 8.00 9.48 
Mean elevation (m above sea level)  1,244  1,266  1,333  1,211 
Neighbouring Park ranger office (1 
= yes)
 ϒ 
0.77 0.60 0.55  0.76 
b    (community’s benefits  









Food shortages, 1980-2001 (1 = 
yes) 
0.77 0.60 0.64  0.71 
Max % loss of harvest due to 
drought, 1980-2001 
62.69* 38.67  40.91  55.59 
% village temporary outmigrants, 
2001
ϒ 
4.13  2.17  3.08  3.07 
% of community area located inside 
park 
61.92*  75.40  64.59  72.09 
% principle livelihood from timber, 
2001 
0.09  0.15  0*  0.20 
% principle livelihood rattan & 
timber, 2001 
6.23*  0.73 4.59 2.44 
Price rice, Rp per kg, 2001  2,218  2,070  2,289*  2,042 
Price coffee, Rp per kg, 2001  4,146  4,197 4,300 4,088 
Price rice land (rice), Rp per ha, 
2001 
8,613,600 7,687,500 7,722,200  8,392,900 
Price land (other ag), Rp per ha, 
2001 
8,830,800  9,664,600  8,835,000  9,495,000 
Rattan price, per kg, 2001  570  714  588  667 
Timber price, per m3, 2001  530,769 500,000 463,636  550,000 
s   (community’s costs of internal  expect   expect   expect   expect   34
monitoring & sanctioning)  s higher  s lower  s higher  s lower 
#  hh,  2001  242.46 260.27 218.91 273.41 
% hh natives, 2001
ϒ  82.61  88.75 91.77 82.09 
Evidence of conflict among native 
hh, 1995-2001 (1 = yes) 
0.55 0.71 0.54 0.73 
Evidence of conflict between native 
& migrant hh, 1995-2001 (1 = yes) 
0.00** 0.29  0.23  0.13 
Evidence of conflict with hh from 
another village, 1995-2001 (1 = 
yes) 
0.45  0.18  0.46*  0.13 
%HH sold all land, 2001  22.57  4.73 4.46  18.54 
%HH with no land, 2001  5.58  1.84 2.77 4.09 
Land distribution, 2001 (Gini)  0.45*  0.22 0.34 0.41 
Village previously part of another 
village 
0.31*  0.067 0.18  0.18 
%working population in labour 
sharing groups
ϒ 
24.08 22.02 29.89 18.51 








Evidence of conflict over forest 
conversion in park, between village 
& park 
0.38 0.60 0.55  0.47 
Knowledge of other communities 
moving out of the park, (1 = yes) 
0.54  0.33  0.82***  0.18 
Type of knowledge from KKMs: 
allow villages to use forest/forest 
products (1 = yes) 
0.54 0.60 0.64  0.53 
Type of knowledge from KKMs: 
give forest rights to communities (1 
= yes) 
0.62 0.73 0.73  0.65 
Community knowledge of KKMs 
before or during KKM (1 = yes) 
0.75  0.73 0.70 0.76 
Why KKM? NGO worried about 
forest degradation, (1 = yes) 
0.54**  0.13   0.45  0.24 
Why KKM? Village wanted to 
claim forest, (1 = yes) 
0.23*  0.53 0.36 0.41 
Note: Some villages that were promised claim to not have received benefits as of 2006. Yet, some 
villages that did claim benefits in 2006 were not promised these when the KKM was negotiated. 
Significant differences between means of variables listed in the first column (‘AgDev’) and the 
second (‘No AgDev’) are indicated in the first column: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1 
ϒ Indicates that proxy is inversely related to the parameter of interest, so that the predicted direction of 
the correlation is reversed. (For example, neighboring park ranger office proxies for lower K, therefore 
a higher value is expected for FF and KKM than for PT communities in this case.) See also Appendix 
B.  35
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APPENDIX A: Proof of  L L
~ ˆ <  
Suppose  L L
~ ˆ ≥ . Then, by concavity of b,  ).
~
( ' ) ˆ ( ' L b L b ≤ From (4) and (1), this implies 
),
~
( ' ) ˆ ( ' ) ˆ ( ' L e L e L v ≤ +  and hence, since v’>0,  ).
~
( ' ) ˆ ( ' L e L e <  However, given the 
convexity of e, this would imply that  L L
~ ˆ < , which contradicts our initial assumption. 
Thus  L L
~ ˆ ≥  is not possible, and it must be that  L L
~ ˆ < .   37
APPENDIX B – RATIONALE UNDERLYING PROXIES 
 
Variable High  value 
of proxy =  
higher (+) 
or lower (-) 
parameter  
Rationale 
V (conservation benefits of park) 
Community area neighbours a prime bird-
watching site, 2001 
+  LLNP contains many endemic bird species 
with a number of bird-watching sites located 
in and around the park. 
K (cost to Park for monitoring and enforcement) 
Community area neighbours a park ranger 
office 
-  Better accessibility to community and 
surrounds makes it easier (cheaper) for park to 
monitor (smaller K) 
Mean % hilly area (>20°)  +  The larger the area defined as ‘hilly’, the 
harder and more difficult for Park to monitor 
[could also affect b and s] 
Mean elevation (m above sea level)  +  The higher the elevation, the more difficult for 
Park to monitor [could also affect b and s] 
b (community’s benefits from reducing forest level) 
Food shortages, 1980-2001 (1 = yes)  + 
Max % loss of harvest due to drought, 1980-
2001 
+ 
Evidence for drought/food subsidies/food 
shortages indicates larger benefits from forest 
conversion for agriculture 
% village population as temporary 
outmigrants, 2001 
-  The more outmigrants, e.g. working in city, 
the less dependence on forest for livelihoods.  
% of community’s total area located inside 
park 
+  The more territory inside park, the more 
community benefits from park forest 
exploitation.  
% HH with principle livelihoods dependent 
on timber, 2001 
+ 
% HH with principle livelihoods dependent 
on rattan & timber, 2001 
+ 
Greater proportion of HH engaged in timber 
and/or rattan, the more benefits to community 
from forest exploitation (direct use only).  
Price rice, Rp per kg, 2001  + 
Price coffee, Rp per kg, 2001  + 
Rattan price Rp per kg, 2001  + 
Timber price Rp per M3, 2001  + 
Higher prices imply greater incentives to 
further exploit forest.  
Price rice land (rice), Rp per ha, 2001  + 
Price land (other ag), Rp per ha, 2001  + 
Higher land prices imply greater incentives to 
capitalize on more forest reduction   
e (community’s extraction costs) 
% households with ’01 off-farm earners   +  More households in off-farm labour implies 
greater opportunity costs of time hence raising 
community extraction costs. (may also impact 
on s) 
% of children 13-18 in school, 2001  +  More children between ages of 13 and 18 in 
school who would otherwise supply labour to 
households implies greater opportunity costs 
of time hence raising community extraction 
costs. 
r
C (community’s discount rate) 
Government/NGO credit programme, 1980-
2001 (1 = yes) 
? 
Other credit programme, 1980-2001 (1 = yes)  ? 
Evidence of credit indicates collateral and 
possibilities for investment for future returns. 
Effect on ambiguous since either the already 
rich can access credit (have collateral) or 
credit is targeted at the poor in order to 
alleviate poverty.  
s (community’s costs of establishing an internal monitoring & sanctioning system)  38




Collective action theory: more HH/people 
increases costs of effective collective action 
necessary for establishing effective 
monitoring and enforcement system  
% hh natives, 2001  -  Collective action theory: greater ethnic 
homogeneity decreases costs of effective 
collective action  
Evidence of conflict among native hh, 1995-
2001 (1 = yes) 
+  Collective action theory: Previous conflict 
makes effective collective action more 
difficult and more costly 
Evidence of conflict between native & 
migrant hh, 1995-2001 (1 = yes) 
+  Collective action theory: Previous conflict 
makes effective collective action more 
difficult and more costly  
Evidence of conflict with hh from another 
village, 1995-2001 (1 = yes) 
+  Collective action theory: Previous conflict 
makes effective collective action more 
difficult and more costly  
%HH sold all land, 1995-2001  + 
%HH with no land, 2001  + 
Land distribution, 2001 (Gini)  + 
Collective action theory: greater land 
inequality and HH without land makes 
effective collective action more difficult and 
more costly  
Village previously part of another village  +/-  Evidence for split from another village could 
either make collective action easier to 
undertake (smaller s) or harder  
%working population in labour sharing 
groups 
-  Collective action theory: the more workers 
engaged in labour sharing, the easier to enable 
effective collective action  
τ, community bargaining power 
Evidence of conflict over forest conversion in 
park, between village & park 
+  Experience of conflict with park gives the 
community leverage over dealing with the 
park 
Knowledge of other communities moving out 
of the park, 2006 (1 = yes) 
+  Knowledge of other communities implies 
community can learn about strategy  
Type of knowledge from KKMs: allow 
villages to use forest/forest products, (1 = 
yes) 
+ 
Type of knowledge from KKMs: give forest 
rights to communities, (1 = yes) 
+ 
The more the community knows about other 
KKM and the costs and benefits of an 
agreement, the stronger its bargaining power?  
Community knowledge of KKMs before or 
during KKM (1 = yes) 
+  The more the community learns about other 
KKM before it negotiates its own KKM, the 
more bargaining power it has  
Why KKM? NGO worried about forest 
degradation, (1 = yes) 
+ 
Why KKM? Village wanted to claim forest, 
(1 = yes) 
+ 
The more the other party is worried about 
forest deg and the more it has preferences to 
claim forest, the more power the community 
has 
 